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Abstract. Property taxation has been in the focus of economic considerations in Serbia 
only in the last few years. In the absence of the alternative revenue sources, the property 
tax is designated by the state authorities in Serbia as a potential source of additional 
revenue. Legislative changes, particularly Property Taxes Law amendments in 2010, 
made the formal conditions for the increase of the property tax burden and progressivity. 
As the motive for increasing the property tax burden, the government has appointed more 
appropriate property valuation, while for increasing the tax progressivity achieving 
greater vertical equity argument has been selected, along with higher tax revenues that 
remain available to local authorities. This paper considers whether there has been an 
increase in the tax burden and progressivity of the property tax in Serbia, via the 
empirical measurement of theoretically funded indicators. The results show that, in 
general, property tax in the future may generate a greater burden, particularly for 
taxpayers who own valuable properties, which may be followed by moderate increase in 
tax progressivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Property taxation in Serbia is passed to the local government with the adoption of the 
Local Government Finance Law in 2006. The local authorities are responsible for the 
assessment of the tax base, tax collection and establishing tax rates within the limits set in 
the state legislative provisions. This direction of local authorities funding is also 
supported by changes of the Property Taxes Law, which defines the basic elements of the 
taxation object, tax base, tax rates and tax credits. In recent years, a large number of 
studies have considered property tax as one of the taxes that could increase tax revenue, 
while simultaneously achieving a more equitable income redistribution. The scope of 
                                                 

 Received February 10, 2014 / Accepted March 31, 2014 
Corresponding author: Stevan Luković 
Faculty of Economics Kragujevac Ðure Pucara Starog 3, 34000 Kragujevac, Serbia 
Tel: +381 34 303 500 • E-mail: slukovic@kg.ac.rs 
S. LUKOVIĆ 62 
property tax can be widened, through more efficient defining of the taxpayer’s 
responsibilites and property tax base. This is the aspect of the property tax that mostly 
draws the attention of economic experts in Serbia. However, recently the focus of 
considerations is on increasing the tax burden to be borne by taxpayers, accompanied by 
increase in the tax progressivity. As the main impulse for the tax burden increase the 
government authorities have selected more adequate valuation of the property, while as 
the key motivation for progressivity increase greater vertical equity is pointed out. 
Regarding this, the amendments to the Property Taxes Law from 2010 altered certain 
elements of the final tax liability calculation. The main objective of this study is to 
determine whether the legislative changes from 2010 increased the burden and/or the 
progressivity of the taxation of property owned by individuals, and whether the increase 
has affected only individuals that own valuable properties or if it has affected the owners 
of the low value properties as well. 
The hypothesis tested in this paper is that, after the legislative changes from 2010, an 
increase in the property tax burden has occured, as well as an increase in the property tax 
progressivity. To determine the characteristics of the property tax burden and 
progressivity, the range of real estate values is considered with the introduction of certain 
assumptions about real estate and taxpayer. By using legally prescribed parameters for 
tax liability calculation, tax is levied to pay for each of the real estate values within a 
defined value range, both before legislative changes in 2010 and after the legislative 
changes in 2010. Afterward, we introduce five fiscal indicators, of which the first three 
measure the tax burden, and the last two measure the tax progressivity. Comparing values 
before and after the legislative changes, conclusions are given regarding changes in the 
tax burden and progressivity. 
The paper is arranged as follows. After the introduction, the second section provides 
the review of Property Taxes Law Amendment Act in 2010, which has introduced 
significant adjustments in all phases of tax liability calculation. The third part of the 
paper refers to the methodology of measuring the tax burden and progressivity. In the 
fourth part, the results of the analysis are given. The final part presents the conclusions. 
1. PROPERTY TAXES LAW AMENDMENT ACT FROM 2010  
Property taxation in Serbia is regulated by Property Taxes Law, which was changed 
in several occasions after the adoption in 2001. Over a number of years the property tax 
has been criticized, especially in terms of complexity and ambiguity in the tax base 
assessment. All rights on the property covered by the Property Taxes Law are subject to 
taxation. Property tax in Serbia is local tax - defined as a source of local governments 
revenue (Local Government Finance Law, article 6). However, the elements that 
constitute tax base and the maximum tax rate that local governments may apply are 
determined by the Property Taxes Law, while the tax rate decision is made by the local 
government within the limits established by the central government (Popović, D., p. 353).  
Amendments to the Property Taxes Law were made repeatedly in Serbia, but in this 
paper we focus on the Property Taxes Law Amendment Act from 2010. This Law 
amendment introduced a number of changes in all phases of the tax liability calculation. At 
the real estate value assessment phase, value of real estate is accepted as a tax base. The 
value is calculated by applying the basic and corrective elements. The basic elements are 
usable area and the administrative average price per square meter of suitable real estate in 
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the territory of a municipality, while the corrective elements are location and the quality of 
real estate (Property Taxes Law, article 6). Finally, the value calculated in this way is 
modified by the annual depreciation factor. The Law amendment lowered the amount of 
annual depreciation from 1.5% to 0.8%, while the maximum amount of depreciation that 
could be applied has been reduced from 70 % to 40 % (Property Taxes Law, article 5).  
As for tax rates and tax brackets, some changes have also been made. Before the 
amendments, the tax structure looked as follows: 
 Tax base Tax rates 
1 Up to 6,000,000 dinars up to 0.40% 
2 6,000,001 – 15,000,000 dinars tax (1) + up to 0.80%  
on the amount above 6,000,000 dinars 
3 15,000,001 – 30,000,000 dinars tax (2) + up to 1.50%  
on the amount above 15,000,000 dinars 
4 Above 30,000,000 dinars tax (3) + up to 3%  
on the amount above 30,000,000 dinars 
Source: Property Taxes Law, Official Gazette of RS, No. 26/01, 45/02, 42/02, 80/02, 135/04, 61/07, 5/09 
If only marginal tax rates are considered, it might be concluded that the property 
taxation in Serbia was very progressive because the tax rates rise from 0.4 % up to 3%. 
However, it should be noted that, according to the Tax Administration data, in 99.7% of 
tax returns, the tax base calculated for real estates owned by individuals amounted to less 
than 6 million dinars in 2006, i.e., taxed at a rate which stood at 0.4 % or below that 
percent. However, this figure was significantly reduced in 2009, especially in larger 
towns where the most valuable properties owned by individuals are located, primarily 
because local governments have increased the average price per square meter of real 
estate by 10% to 30% (Levitas, T. et al., 2010, p. 109). With adequate real estate 
valuation and the gradual introduction of market values as a tax base, it can be expected 
that the number of taxpayers in the higher tax brackets increases.  
After the Law amendment, composition of tax rates and tax brackets looks as in the table: 
 Tax base Tax rates 
1 Up to 10,000,000 dinars up to 0,40% 
2 10,000,001 – 25,000,000 dinars tax (1) + up to 0,60%  
on the amount above 10,000,000 dinars 
3 25,000,001 – 50,000,000 dinars tax (2) + up to 1,00%  
on the amount above 25,000,000 dinars 
4 above 50,000,000 dinars tax (3) + up to 2%  
on the amount above 50,000,000 dinars 
Source: Property Taxes Law, Official Gazette of RS, No. 26/01, 45/02, 42/02, 80/02, 135/04, 61/07, 5/09, 101/10 
If only changes in the composition of tax rates and brackets are observed and other 
changes are neglected, a premature conclusion that a mitigation of progressivity occured 
could be derived. 
In the final phase of tax liability calculation, the total amount of the tax credit has 
been reduced. The tax credit, which amounted 40% of tax liability for the sole resident 
taxpayer and 10% for each household member (provided that the total amount of the tax 
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credit could not exceed 70% of the tax liability) is corrected. For the sole taxpayer, 
providing the condition of residency in the taxable real estate is fulfilled, the tax credit 
has been raised to 50% of the tax liability, but it can not exceed the amount of 20,000 
dinars (Property Taxes Law, article 13). In this way, this tax incentive can be fully 
utilized only for taxpayers whose tax liability before the application of the tax credit is 
less than or equal to the amount of 40,000 dinars, which significantly increases the 
progressivity of the property tax at the higher tax bases. 
2. THE METHODOLOGY OF MEASURING THE PROPERTY TAX BURDEN AND PROGRESSIVITY 
Measures of tax burden are indicators of how well tax policy meets one of its primary 
goals, equitably raising the revenues needed to run government. Equity has two aspects. 
The first, vertical equity, concerns the way taxes are distributed among taxpayers with 
different abilities to pay. The second, horizontal equity, concerns the way taxes are 
distributed among taxpayers with the same ability to pay. Tax burden measures thus 
answer broad economic and social questions about the effect of tax policy on the 
distribution of income and wealth (Atrostic, B.K. and Nunns, J.R., 1991, p. 343).  
Over time, a number of different indicators of tax burden have appeared, which can 
be classified into four broad categories: 1) Tax rates (nominal, statutory), 2) Tax/GDP 
ratios, 3) Implicit/effective tax rates on consumption, labour or capital and 4) The 
effective ex-ante tax rates (Wolff, G., 2005, p. 2). Nominal rates and the tax/GDP ratios 
were originally used as indicators of tax burden, mainly because of the simplicity and 
accessibility of the necessary data. With the growing complexity of national tax systems, 
the methodology of calculating the tax burden has become more complicated. Effective 
tax rates eliminate some of the disadvantages of using nominal tax rates, and are used in 
many papers to measure the consumption, capital or labour tax burden. In the past, most 
of the papers were focused on the profit tax burden, and its impact on the investment 
process. As a reaction to this trend, methodologies of average effective (AETR) and 
marginal effective (METR) tax rates were developed. In recent years, an emphasis has 
been placed on the tax burden on labour as a factor of production, where the effective tax 
rates have been used to show the labour tax burden at different income levels for the 
representative individual with strictly defined characteristics. 
There are only few papers that analytically approach the problem of determining the 
property tax burden. Papers dealing with the property taxation mainly studied other 
aspects of the property tax, while the tax burden has been ignored. In the United States, 
the property tax burden has always attracted the attention of economists, since it is the 
most important revenue to local authorities and the differences in the tax burden in 
various states are significant. The two most popular indicators of the property tax burden 
that American economists have used are the property taxes per capita and property taxes 
per $1,000 of total income. These indicators are the perfect tools for comparative analysis 
because they can show the differences in the tax burden in individual states, local 
communities and cities. In addition, the effective tax rate as the ratio of tax paid and the 
market value of the real estate is also a popular measure, because it indicates differences 
in the tax burden borne by taxpayers in different tax jurisdictions for real estate with the 
same characteristics. A large number of studies in the United States use just these 
indicators of the tax burden, while in European countries, there is hardly any significant 
research that deals with this aspect of property tax. 
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As far as progressivity, generally speaking, tax can be proportional, progressive or 
regressive. The tax is considered progressive if the average tax rate increases with income 
before tax, that is, if the marginal tax rate is higher than average tax rate along the entire 
income scale. The rate of progressivity is a term often used by economists and politicians, 
but with no clear meaning (Jakobson, U., 1976, p. 161). Generally, tax theory distinguishes 
local and global progressivity. Local (point, interval) progressivity measures the change 
of the average tax rate in one point or between two selected points in the income scale 
and it is closely linked to effective taxation. The outcomes of its analysis can help to 
specify the income intervals where the tax progressivity is the highest or the lowest, in 
what income intervals there are eventual turning points in tax progressivity, i.e. when tax 
changes from one form of progressivity (e.g. progressive) to the other form (proportional 
or regressive) (Široky, J., and Makova, K., 2007, p. 4). While local tax progressivity 
measures progressivity in a certain range of taxpayer's income, and can be used to 
determine the effects of partial tax legislation changes to the specific group of taxpayers, 
the macroeconomic analysis is necessary to determine the index that measures the 
progressivity along the entire income range. Musgrave and Thin (1948), in a very 
influential paper “Income Tax Progression from 1929 to 1948”, introduced four local 
progressivity measures: 
1) Progression of average tax rate; 
2) Progression of marginal tax rate; 
3) Progression of tax liabilities; 
4) Progression of residual income. 
Also, in order to arrive at a single measure of progression, Musgrave and Thin (I 948) 
compared the inequality of the before-tax and after-tax income distributions. A 
progressive tax system is associated with a decrease in income inequality, while 
regressive tax rates will be reflected by an increase in income inequality (Kakwani M., 
1977, p. 72). Available literature regarding the tax progressivity can be divided into 
studies that focus either on the local or global measures of tax progressivity. The largest 
number of early researches has focused on two of the aforementioned four indicators of 
local progressivity, i.e. progressivity of the tax liabilities and progressivity of residual 
income. The former measures the elasticity of the tax liability compared to change in pre-
tax income, while the latter measures the elasticity of after-tax income compared to 
change in pre-tax income (at a certain point of the income scale). 
Very few papers deal with the calculation of property tax progressivity. Even 
researches that consider the progressivity focus more on the aspect of vertical in(equality) 
as an element of importance. A vertically inequitable tax system can be classified as 
“regressive” if higher value properties are taxed more favorably than lower value 
properties and “progressive” if higher value properties are taxed less favorably than lower 
value properties (Allen, M., and Dare, W., 2009, p. 82). On the other hand, in a number 
of works, global progressivity of national tax systems is measured with the inclusion of 
property tax in the observed taxes, so global indices of progressivity of different taxes are 
calculated (Suits's index, Kakwani index and others). These indices are mainly relying on 
Lorentz distribution of income and the Gini coefficient of inequality as tools to measure 
progressivity (Kakinaka, M., and Pereira, M., 2006, p. 1). 
To assess the effects of property taxation in Serbia, a range of real estate value from 
2.5 million dinars to 50 million dinars is established, with a fixed increase in the value of 
real estate of 2.5 million dinars, which gives 20 levels of real estate value. In order to 
determine the tax liability, it is necessary to introduce some assumptions: 
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1. real estate subject to taxation falls within the category of buildings and is located 
in the municipality of Kragujevac; 
2. age of the building is 10 years; 
3. location coefficient is 0.6 (the real estate in the suburban area); 
4. quality coefficient of property is 560/695 (0.86); 
5. taxpayer is an individual who resides in the taxable property with three household 
members. 
These assumptions allow us to calculate the tax base, on which the tax rates are 
imposed in the municipality of Kragujevac, before and after the Property Taxes Law 
amendment from 2010 (Table 1). In this way tax liability is calculated, but it must be 
adjusted by applying the tax credit. The remaining amount represents the final tax 
liability. As it can be seen, only the taxation of real estate owned by individuals is 
considered, while taxation of enterprises is not the subject of this paper. 
Table 1 Property tax structure in the municipality of Kragujevac  
(before and after the Property Taxes Law amendment in 2010) 
Before amendment After amendment 
Tax base Tax rates Tax base Tax rates 
Up to 6  
milion dinars 
0.30% Up to 10 milion 
dinars 
0.20% 
6  15  
milion dinars 
18 thousand dinars + 
0.80% on the amount 
above 6 mil. dinars 
10  25  
milion dinars 
20 thousand dinars + 
0.60% on the amount 
above 10 mil. dinars 
15  30  
milion dinars 
90 thousand dinars + 
1.50% on the amount 
above 15 mil. dinars 
25  50 milion 
RSD 
110 thousand dinars + 
1% on the amount 
above 25 mil. dinars 
Above 30 
milion dinars 
315 thousand dinars + 
3% on the amount above 
30 mil. dinars 
Above 50 milion 
RSD 
360 thousand dinars + 
2% on the amount 
above 50 mil. dinars 
Source: Property Taxes Law, Kragujevac Local Government Decision on the Property Tax Rate  
for 2009 and 2010 
To analyze the property tax burden and progressivity five measures are used: 
1) The total amount of tax liability; 
2) Tax rate T1, calculated as a ratio of the total tax paid and the tax base; 
3) Tax rate T2, calculated as a ratio of tax before the tax credit and the property value; 
4) local index of progressivity of tax liability, which is obtained using the formula 
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5) Local index of residual progressivity, obtained using the formula 
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where X is the value of the property after tax (Y  T), T is the amount of tax and Y 
is the pre-tax property value. 
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The first three indicators measure the burden that property tax creates for property 
owners. While the tax burden just shows what part of taxpayer’s income is transfered in 
the form of taxes, the extent of progressivity shows changes in the tax burden of 
taxpayers in accordance with income changes. Local measure of progressivity of the tax 
liability shows that, if its value is greater than 1, a progressive tax is in place, while if 
value is smaller than 1, tax is considered to be regressive. Its value can show in what real 
estate value range an increase in the tax progressivity occurs. Also, if the value of the 
residual progressivity measure is smaller than 1 tax is considered progressive, otherwise, 
if its value is greater than 1, tax is regressive. 
 The analysis is carried out with respect to the previously defined assumptions 
concerning the characteristics of taxpayer and property. Respecting different sets of 
assumptions, we could get quite different results. Also, local tax progressivity measures 
are used, which do not provide a comprehensive measure of tax progressivity. 
Calculating a global index of progressivity, which requires a large set of specialized data 
on the income distribution and the tax burden, would generate more useful information 
about the nature of the property tax progressivity in Serbia. 
3. THE RESULTS 
After identifying all important elements, all the above mentioned tax indicators can be 
calculated. The values are shown in Table 2 and the graphs that follow. Table 2 shows the 
increase in tax liability that occured after legislative changes for the real estate value up to 
Table 2 Property tax burden and progressivity, before and after the Property Taxes Law 
amendment in 2010 
 1) Tax liability 2) Tax rate T1 3) Tax rate T2 4) Indicator υ1 5) Indicator υ2 
Value Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
2.5 mil. 986,9 1186,8 0,090 0,100 0,132 0,095     
5 mil. 1973,7 2373,6 0,090 0,100 0,132 0,095 1 1 1,00000 1,00000 
7.5 mil. 2960,6 3560,4 0,090 0,100 0,132 0,095 1 1 1,00000 1,00000 
10 mil. 3947,4 4747,2 0,090 0,100 0,132 0,095 1 1 1,00000 1,00000 
12.5 mil. 4934,3 5934,0 0,090 0,100 0,132 0,095 1 1 1,00000 1,00000 
15 mil. 6789,6 7120,8 0,103 0,100 0,151 0,095 1,88 1 0,99971 1,00000 
17.5 mil. 9421,2 8307,6 0,123 0,100 0,179 0,095 2,32 1 0,99949 1,00000 
20 mil. 12052,8 9494,4 0,137 0,100 0,201 0,095 1,95 1 0,99955 1,00000 
22.5 mil. 14684,4 12043,6 0,149 0,113 0,218 0,107 1,75 2,15 0,99960 0,99952 
25 mil. 17316,0 15604,0 0,158 0,131 0,231 0,125 1,61 2,66 0,99964 0,99920 
27.5 mil. 19947,6 19164,4 0,165 0,147 0,242 0,139 1,52 2,28 0,99967 0,99927 
30 mil. 22579,2 25449,6 0,172 0,179 0,251 0,151 1,45 3,61 0,99970 0,99833 
32.5 mil. 25210,8 32570,4 0,177 0,211 0,259 0,162 1,39 3,36 0,99972 0,99815 
35 mil. 28579,5 39691,2 0,186 0,239 0,272 0,171 1,74 2,84 0,99947 0,99828 
37.5 mil. 33513,8 46812,0 0,204 0,263 0,298 0,178 2,42 2,51 0,99892 0,99840 
40 mil. 38448,0 53932,8 0,219 0,284 0,320 0,185 2,21 2,28 0,99899 0,99850 
42.5 mil. 43382,3 61053,6 0,233 0,303 0,340 0,191 2,05 2,11 0,99905 0,99859 
45 mil. 48316,5 68174,4 0,245 0,319 0,358 0,196 1,93 1,98 0,99910 0,99866 
47.5 mil. 53250,8 75295,2 0,256 0,334 0,374 0,201 1,84 1,88 0,99915 0,99873 
50 mil 58185,0 82416,0 0,265 0,347 0,388 0,205 1,76 1,79 0,99919 0,99880 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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15 million dinars, and a decline in the range from 17.5 to 27.5 million dinars. For the higher 
values there is a continuous increase in the tax liabiliy, that can be seen in the Chart 1A. 
This trend can be confirmed by observing tax rate T1, which keeps the pace with changes in 
tax liability. In the graph 1B three distinctive zones can be discerned. In the first zone, (real 
estate value ranging from 2.5 to 15 million dinars) tax rates before and after Property Taxes 
Law amendment are approximately equal. In the second zone, ranging from 17.5 to 27.5 
million dinars, tax rate before is higher than the tax rate after the Law amendment. 
Only in the third zone, ranging from 30 to 50 mil. dinars, tax rate after the legislative 
changes becomes greater than the tax rate before the changes, and the difference rises 
with the increase in real estate value. As it will be shown later, the main factor 
influencing this behaviour of tax liability and indicator T1 is tax credit. 
    
 A: Tax liability  B: Tax rate T1 
     
 C: Tax rate T2  D: Indicator υ1 
 
E: Indicator υ2 
Fig. 1 The amount of tax liability, tax rate T1, tax rate T2 and indicators of local 
progressivity υ1 and υ2, before and after the legislative changes 
0.0
10000.0
20000.0
30000.0
40000.0
50000.0
60000.0
70000.0
80000.0
90000.0
25
00
00
0.0
75
00
00
0.0
12
50
00
00
.0
17
50
00
00
.0
22
50
00
00
.0
27
50
00
00
.0
32
50
00
00
.0
37
50
00
00
.0
42
50
00
00
.0
47
50
00
00
.0
Before changes
After changes
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
25
00
00
0.
0
10
00
00
00
.0
17
50
00
00
.0
25
00
00
00
.0
32
50
00
00
.0
40
00
00
00
.0
47
50
00
00
.0
Before changes
After changes
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
0.350
0.400
0.450
25
00
00
0.
0
10
00
00
00
.0
17
50
00
00
.0
25
00
00
00
.0
32
50
00
00
.0
40
00
00
00
.0
47
50
00
00
.0
Before
changes
After
changes
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
25
00
00
0.
0
50
00
00
0.
0
75
00
00
0.
0
10
00
00
00
.0
12
50
00
00
.0
15
00
00
00
.0
17
50
00
00
.0
20
00
00
00
.0
22
50
00
00
.0
25
00
00
00
.0
27
50
00
00
.0
30
00
00
00
.0
32
50
00
00
.0
35
00
00
00
.0
37
50
00
00
.0
40
00
00
00
.0
42
50
00
00
.0
45
00
00
00
.0
47
50
00
00
.0
Before changes
After changes
0.99700
0.99750
0.99800
0.99850
0.99900
0.99950
1.00000
1.00050
25
00
00
0.
0
75
00
00
0.
0
12
50
00
00
.0
17
50
00
00
.0
22
50
00
00
.0
27
50
00
00
.0
32
50
00
00
.0
37
50
00
00
.0
42
50
00
00
.0
47
50
00
00
.0
Before changes
After changes
 Property Tax Burden and Progressivity in the Case of Serbia  69 
Unlike T1, indicator T2 displays continuous increase compared to the values after the 
legislative changes. This can be explained by the fact that T2 is the ratio of tax liability 
before applying tax credit, so tax credit change does not affect the T2 value (Figure 1C). 
Local progressivity of the tax liability is higher after legislative changes in the real 
estate value range from 22.5 to 50 million dinars (Figure 1D). However, this indicator 
shows that progressivity rises for the real estate values ranging from 22.5 to 35 million 
dinars, while the progressivity before and after tax changes are very close for values 
ranging from 37.5 to 50 million dinars. This trend is confirmed by the indicator of the 
residual progressivity (Figure 1E), whose value after legislative changes is continuously 
lower than the value before the legislative changes for the real estate values in the 22.5-
50 million dinars range. 
Having established the above mentioned indicators, the remainder of the paper deals 
with the question which of the taxation elements that were subject to legislative changes 
contribute to increase in the tax burden and/or progressivity, and which are acting in the 
opposite direction. The elements which were altered are the amount of depreciation, tax 
rates, tax brackets and the tax credit. To determine which elements have increased the tax 
burden and progressivity, it is necessary to recalculate the previously observed indicators, 
but in a way that only one of the elements changes, while keeping the other elements 
unchanged (ceteris paribus). In this way, only the element that is modified affects the tax 
burden and progressivity, so the direction of its isolated effect can be observed. This 
procedure is implemented for each of the elements. 
3.1. The effects of tax credit change 
Observing the isolated effect of change in the tax credit, we can notice that it is a factor 
that dramatically increases the value of the tax rate T1, especially at higher real estate 
values, because starting from real estate value 17.5 mil. dinars, the tax credit "freezes" at 
20,000 dinars, and just after this level there is a significant increase of difference between 
the tax rate before and after the legislative changes. The tax rate T2 measures the ratio of tax 
liability before the tax credit and the value of the property, and since it is not affected by the 
value of tax credit, the tax rate before and after the legislative changes remains the same. 
We conclude that the tax credit is a factor that leads to a significant increase in the tax 
burden, especially for taxpayers with valuable real estates. 
As for local progressivity of the tax liability, for the real estate value up to 20.0 mil. 
dinars, progressivity before and after legislative changes are approximately equal. For 
higher real estate values, progressivity after the legislative changes is constantly higher 
than the progressivity before the changes. Due to the occurrence of significant differences 
in the amount of tax credit before and after the legislative changes, at the level of real 
estate value of 22.5 million dinars a swift rise of υ1 occurs, which at that point reaches its 
maximum. Indicator of residual progressivity υ2 tracks changes of the progressivity of tax 
liability, because its values before and after the legislative changes up to the real estate 
value of 17.5 million RSD are approximately equal, but after that point a significant 
difference is noticeable. For easier interpretation, the indicators are graphically shown 
(Figure 2), where we can see all the above trends. 
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 A: T1  B: T2 
  
 C: υ1  D: υ2 
Fig. 2 Isolated effect of change in tax credit 
Tax rates T1, T2 and local indicators of progressivity υ1 and υ2 
3.2. The effects of tax rates and tax brackets changes 
Regarding changes in tax rates and tax brackets, in Fig. 3 a decrease in the value of 
tax rates T1 and T2 for all real estate values after legislative changes is apparent. The tax 
rate T1, after legislative changes, remains continuously lower than the tax rate before the 
changes. With the increase in real estate value, the difference between tax rates increases. 
A similar trend can be observed for the tax rate T2. Looking at these two indicators, we 
can state that the isolated changes in tax rates and brackets caused the reduction of the tax 
burden, which is intensifying as the real estate value rises. 
Considering the progressivity of the tax liability, there is no single trend. The reason 
for this lies in the fact that the progressivity of the tax liability represents the ratio of two 
relative values, the relative change of tax liability and the relative change in real estate 
value. Given that the relative change in real estate value is fixed before and after the 
legislative changes, the difference in the value of the indicator before and after legislative 
changes is only affected by the relative change in tax liability. Prior to legislative 
changes, indicator of progressivity of the tax liability had two peaks (one peak for the real 
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estate value of 17.5 mil. dinars, and the other for the real estate value of 37.5 mil. dinars). 
This can be explained by transitions to higher tax brackets, because for a given range of 
the tax base, before the legislative changes three tax brackets were established, and the 
jump in the indicator value happens immediately after the point where the marginal tax 
rate rises. In the first case, for the real estate value of 15 million dinars the marginal tax 
rates rises from 0.3 % to 0.8 %, and in that point progressivity increases and reaches the 
first peak at the next real estate value. In the second case, for the real estate value of 35 
mil. dinars, marginal tax rates rises from 0.8 % to 1.5 %, and in that point progressivity 
increases and reaches the second peak at the next real estate value. On the other hand, 
after legislative changes, tax brackets are set in a way that only one transition to the next 
bracket exists, at the real estate value of 25 mil. dinars, where progressivity indicator 
reaches its maximum (Fig. 3C). Similar jumps can be observed with indicator of residual 
progressivity (Fig. 3D), which also reports the existence of two points at which a decline 
in indicator value happens before legislative changes, while after changes there is only 
one point where a sharp decline occurs. 
  
 A: T1  B: T2 
  
 C: υ1  D: υ2 
Fig. 3 Isolated effect of changes in the composition of tax rates and tax brackets 
Tax rates T1, T2 and local indicators of progressivity υ1 and υ2 
Based on all the foregoing, we conclude that the isolated change in the tax structure 
has led to a reduction in the progressivity of taxation, that is, a new tax structure is less 
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progressive compared to the previous tax structure in the range of real estate value from 
2.5 to 22.5 million dinars., but, for a range of values from 25 to 35 million dinars it 
becomes more progressive. Finally, for the range of values from 37.5 to 50 mil. dinars, 
again it is less progressive compared to the previous tax structure. 
3.3. The effects of depreciation changes 
Thanks to the reduction in depreciation percentage, after the legislative changes the 
amount of tax to pay is higher for all levels of real estate values. The increase in the tax 
burden can be seen both in the amount of tax payments, as well as with indicators T1 and T2, 
which are higher after legislative changes for all levels of real estate value (Fig. 4A and 4B). 
  
 A: T1  B: T2 
  
 C: υ1  D: υ2 
Fig. 4 Isolated effect of change in depreciation 
Tax rates T1, T2 and local indicators of progressivity υ1 and υ2 
Regarding isolated effect of the depreciation reduction on progressivity, it is a change 
that affects all taxpayers across the entire range of real estate values in the same way. 
Accordingly, changes in the progressivity (Fig. 4C and 4D) can be attributed to 
transitions from one tax bracket to another tax bracket, but not to the reduction in 
depreciation rates. Depreciation decrease is a change that has led to the tax burden 
increase, but does not affect the progressivity. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
Based on all the above, we can see that the changes of parameters in tax payment 
calculation introduced by 2010 Law amendment produced an increase of tax burden to be 
borne by taxpayers. Factors that have led to an increase in the tax burden are reduction of 
real estate depreciation, to a lesser extent, and, to a much greater extent, tax credit 
reduction, especially at higher levels of real estate value. On the other hand, isolated 
changes made in the composition of tax brackets and tax rates have generated the 
reduction in the tax burden at all real estate value levels, but this reduction is not enough 
to offset the impact of tax credit change. In the hypothetical example presented here, tax 
liability becomes constantly higher after legislative changes, but only at higher values 
that exceed 30 million dinars. For lower real estate values, the tax liability in the real 
estate value range from 2.5 to 15 million dinars becomes higher after legislative changes, 
but in the range from 17.5 to 27.5 mil. dinars it becomes lower. In this range the tax rate 
applied is lower after the Law amendments, but the tax credit percent also becomes lower 
along with the lower depreciation rate. The combined impact of the tax credit and 
depreciation prevails so tax liability increases. However, in the range from 17.5 to 27.5 
million dinars, the tax liability after the legislative changes is lower, suggesting that the 
combined impact of tax rates and tax brackets is stronger than the combined impact of tax 
credit and depreciation. For the 30-50 million dinars range, a significant decrease of tax 
credit occurs, which increases the amount of tax liability, i.e., the impact of tax credit and 
depreciation prevails over the influence of tax rates/brackets changes. 
Values of local tax progressivity indicators before and after legislative changes inform 
us that an increase in tax progressivity occurred, but not along the entire scale of real 
estate values. For a real estate value range from 2.5 to 10 million dinars, both 
progressivity indicators have a value of 1, which means that there is no progressivity in 
taxation (this is a proportional tax). Progressivity is more pronounced before the 
legislative changes in the 12.5-17.5 million dinars range, while at higher values, in the 
20-50 million dinars range, property tax progressivity is more pronounced after the 
legislative changes. Using more detailed analysis, we have found that the tax credit 
change led to an increase in progressivity at higher real estate values, that is, the effect of 
changes in tax credit in the direction of increasing progressivity is more pronounced than 
the tax rates/brackets change in the direction of reducing progressivity. On the other 
hand, the impact of changes in the composition of tax rates and tax brackets led to 
reduction in the progressivity at lower real estate values. 
State authorities in Serbia are oriented toward increasing property tax revenue. First 
of all, this will be achieved by introducing market values of the real estate as tax base. 
Currently, due to the tax base undervaluation, the analysis conducted in this paper has a 
theoretical character, because the share of taxpayers in the higher tax brackets is low. 
Also, the authorities for two years in a row limit the full implementation of the legal 
provisions through prevention of interannual rise of tax liabilities reported in the annual 
tax returns. With the introduction of market-valued tax base, it can be expected that the 
degree of undervaluation of the base will be significantly reduced. In this case, the burden 
of paying taxes will be higher, especially for taxpayers who own valuable properties, 
which will lead to an increase in property tax revenue. As far as progressivity, legislative 
changes have resulted in greater tax progressivity for valuable real estates, which, 
accompanied by an increase in average tax rates can lead to achieving greater 
redistributive effects and more equitable income redistribution. However, given the low 
property tax revenue, it can hardly be expected that this effect will be overly significant.  
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PORESKI TERET I PROGRESIVNOST POREZA 
NA IMOVINU U SRBIJI 
Oporezivanje imovine u Srbiji je tek u poslednjih nekoliko godina u fokusu javnofinansijskih 
rasprava. U nedostatku drugih načina za ubiranje nedostajućih budžetskih sredstava, porez na 
imovinu je poreski oblik koji su državni organi u Srbiji odredili kao potencijalan izvor dodatnih 
prihoda. Zakonskim izmenama, a naročito izmenom Zakona o porezima na imovinu iz 2010. godine, 
stvoreni su formalni uslovi za povećanje poreskog opterećenja i progresivnosti u oporezivanju. Kao 
osnovni motiv za povećanje izdašnosti poreza na imovinu državni organi navode adekvatnije 
vrednovanje imovine, dok se kao osnovni motiv za povećanje progresivnosti navodi postizanje veće 
vertikalne pravičnosti, uz istovremeno povećanje poreskih prihoda koji ostaju na raspolaganju 
lokalnim vlastima. U ovom radu utvrđuje se da li je došlo do povećanja poreskog opterećenja i 
progresivnosti u oporezivanju imovine u Srbiji, empirijskim utvrđivanjem vrednosti teorijski 
definisanih pokazatelja. Rezultati analize pokazuju da će, generalno, porez na imovinu u budućnosti 
stvoriti veće opterećenje, i to naročito za poreske obveznike koji poseduju vrednije nepokretnosti, što 
će biti praćeno skromnim rastom progresivnosti u oporezivanju.  
Ključne reči: oporezivanje imovine; poreski teret; progresivnost u oporezivanju, Srbija. 
